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Abstract
We re-examine and extend the findings from the recent paper by Dumitrescu et al. [12]
who studied American options in a particular market model using the nonlinear arbitrage-free
pricing approach developed in El Karoui and Quenez [18]. In the first part, we provide a detailed
study of unilateral valuation problems for the two counterparties in an American-style contract
within the framework of a general nonlinear market. We extend results from Bielecki et al. [5, 6]
who examined the case of a European-style contract. In the second part, we present a BSDE
approach, which is used to establish more explicit pricing, hedging and exercising results when
solutions to reflected BSDEs have additional desirable properties.
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1 Introduction
Unlike contracts of a European style, contracts of American style are asymmetric between the two
counterparties (hereafter referred to as the issuer and the holder) not only due to the opposite
directions of contractual cash flows, but also due to the fact that only one party, the holder of
an American option, has the right to exercise (that is, to stop and settle) an American contract
before its expiration date, which we invariably denote as T . The issues of arbitrage-free pricing and
rational exercising of American options within the framework of a linear market model (usually for
the classical Black and Scholes model, but possibly with trading constraints, such as: no borrowing
of cash or no short-selling of shares) have been studied in numerous papers, to mention just a few:
Bensoussan [4], El Karoui et al. [16], Jaillet et al. [25], Karatzas [27], Karatzas and Kou [28], Kallsen
and Ku¨hn [26], Klimsiak and Rozkosz [34], Myneni [37] and Rogers [44].
The goal of this work is to re-examine and extend the findings from the recent paper by Du-
mitrescu et al. [12] who studied American options within the framework of a particular imperfect
market model with default using the nonlinear arbitrage-free pricing approach developed in El Karoui
and Quenez [18]. In contrast to [12] (see also [11] for the case of game options), we place ourselves
within the setup of a general nonlinear arbitrage-free market, as introduced in Bielecki et al. [5, 6],
and we examine general properties of fair and acceptable unilateral prices. We also obtain more
explicit results regarding pricing, hedging and break-even times for the issuer and rational exercise
times for the holder using a BSDE approach without being specific about the dynamics of underlying
assets, but by focusing instead on pertinent general features of solutions to reflected BSDEs.
Let us introduce some notation for a generic nonlinear market model. Let (Ω,G,G,P) be a
filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness, where
the filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For convenience,
we assume that the initial σ-field G0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows are
implicitly assumed to be G-adapted and, as usual, any semimartingale is assumed to be ca`dla`g. For
simplicity of notation, we assume throughout that the trading conditions are identical for the issuer
and the holder, although this assumption can be relaxed without any difficulty since we examine
unilateral valuation and hedging problems. Let T = T[0,T ] stand for the class of all G-stopping times
taking values in [0, T ]. We adopt the following definition of an American contingent claim.
By convention, all cash flows of a contract are described from the perspective of the issuer. Hence
when a cash flow is positive for the issuer, then the cash amount is paid by the holder and received
by the issuer. Obviously, if a cash flow is negative for the issuer, then the cash amount is transferred
from the issuer to the holder. For instance, when dealing with the classical case of an American put
option written on a stock S, we assume that the payoff to the issuer (respectively, the holder) equals
Xhτ = −(K−Sτ )
+ (respectively, Xhτ = (K−Sτ )
+) if the option is exercised at time τ by the holder.
This is formalized through the following definition of an American contingent claim. Note that the
superscript h in Xh is used to emphasize that only the holder has the right to exercise and hence
to stop the contract; this can be contrasted with the case of a game option (see, e.g., Kifer [29, 30]
and the references therein) where the covenants stipulate that both parties may exercise and hence
stop the contract.
Definition 1.1. An American contingent claim with the G-adapted, ca`dla`g payoff process Xh is a
contract between the issuer and the holder where the holder has the right to exercise the contract
by selecting a G-stopping time τ ∈ T[0,T ]. Then the issuer ‘receives’ the amount X
h
τ or, equivalently,
‘pays’ to the holder the amount of −Xhτ at time τ where the G-adapted payoff process X
h
t , t ∈ [0, T ]
is specified by the contract. Note that we do not make any a priori assumptions about the sign of
the payoff process Xh, so it can be either positive or negative, in general.
More generally, an American contract is formally identified with a triplet Ca = (A,Xh, T ) where
a G-adapted, ca`dla`g stochastic process A, which is predetermined by the contract’s clauses, rep-
resents the cumulative cash flows from time 0 till the contract’s maturity date T . In the financial
interpretation, the process A is assumed to model all the cash flows of a given American contract,
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which are either paid out from the issuer’s wealths or added to his wealth via the value process of
his portfolio of traded assets.
By symmetry, an analogous interpretation applies to the holder of an American contract and,
obviously, any amount received (respectively, paid) by one of the parties is paid (respectively, re-
ceived) by the other one. Note, however, that the price of the contract Ca, which is exchanged at
its initiation (by convention, at time 0), is not included in the process A so that we set A0 = 0.
This convention is motivated by the fact that the contract’s price before the deal is made is yet
unspecified and thus it needs to be determined through negotiations between the counterparties
and we will argue that unilateral pricing does not yield a common value for the initial price of an
American contract, in general.
When examining the valuation of an American contract at any time t ∈ [0, T ], we implicitly
assume that it has not yet been exercised and thus the set of exercise times available at time t to
its current holder is the class T[t,T ] of all G-stopping times taking values in [t, T ]. In principle, one
could consider two alternative conventions regarding the payoff upon exercise: either
(A.1) the cash flow upon exercise at time t equals At −At− +Xht or
(A.2) if a contract is exercised at time t, then the cash flow At − At− is waived, so the only cash
flow occurring at time t is Xht .
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we work under covenant (A.1) and we acknowledge that the choice
of a particular settlement rule may result in a different price for an American contract Ca, in general.
Of course, this choice is immaterial when the process A is continuous or, simply, when it vanishes,
so that the contract reduces to a pair (Xh, T ).
In the classical linear market model, if the terminal payoff of a contract is negative (or positive),
then it is easy to recognize whether the fair price for a given party should be positive (or negative)
and thus it is less important to keep track of signs of cash flows. In contrast, in a nonlinear setup it
may occur, for instance, that each party would like to sell a contract for a positive respective price
and thus it is not reasonable to make any a priori assumptions about the signs of prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we work in an abstract nonlinear setup, meaning
that we only make fairly general assumptions about the nonlinear dynamics of the wealth process
of self-financing strategies. The main postulates of that kind are the monotonicity properties of the
wealth (see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2). We examine general properties of fair and profitable prices for
the two counterparties, the issuer and the holder. In particular, we built upon papers by Bielecki et
al. [5, 6] where the arbitrage-free valuation of European contingent claims in nonlinear markets was
examined. In Section 3, we re-examine and extend a BSDE approach to the valuation of American
options in nonlinear market initiated by El Karoui and Quenez [18] and continued in Dumitrescu et
al. [12]. Our main goal is to show that unilateral acceptable prices for an American contract Ca can
be characterised in terms of solutions to reflected BSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional continuous
semimartingale S. For the sake of concreteness, we postulate in Section 3 that the wealth process
V = V (y, ξ, A) satisfies
Vt = y −
∫ t
0
g(u, Vu, ξu) du+
∫ t
0
ξu dSu +At, (1)
where y ∈ R is the initial wealth at time 0 of a dynamic portfolio ξ (recall that A0 = 0). However,
in order to keep the notation comprehensive, we do not explicitly specify the process S or generator
g but instead we make assumptions about solutions to the SDE (14) and the BSDE (17).
2 Unilateral Fair and Acceptable Prices
Let M = (B,S,Ψ) be a market model which is arbitrage-free with respect to European contracts
in the sense of Bielecki et al. [5, 6]. Here Ψ stands for the class of all admissible trading strategies
and Ψ(y,D) denotes the class of all admissible trading strategies from Ψ with initial wealth y ∈ R
and with external cash flows D. For any trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,D), we denote by V (y, ϕ,D) the
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wealth process of ϕ. Obviously, the equality V0(y, ϕ,D) = y holds for all y ∈ R and any strategy
ϕ. It is assumed throughout that the processes D,Xh and the wealth process V (y, ϕ,D) are ca`dla`g
and G-adapted. We will gradually make more assumptions about the dynamics of wealth processes.
2.1 Benchmark Wealth
An important feature of the nonlinear arbitrage-free approach is the concept of the benchmark wealth
V b(x) with respect to which arbitrage opportunities of a given trader are quantified and assessed.
As in [5, 6], a simple and natural candidate for the benchmark wealth can be given by the equality
V b(x) = V 0(x) where, for an arbitrary initial endowment x ∈ R of a trader, we set for all t ∈ [0, T ]
V 0t (x) := xB
0,l
t 1{x≥0} + xB
0,b
t 1{x<0}
where the risk-free lending (respectively, borrowing) cash account B0,l (respectively, B0,b) is used
for unsecured lending (respectively, borrowing) of cash. Note that V 0(x) represents the wealth
process of a trader who decided at time 0 to keep his initial cash endowment x in either the lending
(when x ≥ 0) or the borrowing (when x < 0) cash account and who is not involved in any other
trading activities between the times 0 and T . By convention, the quantities x1 and x2 represent
initial endowments of the issuer and the holder and thus the processes V 0(x1) and V
0(x2) are their
respective benchmark wealths. Since the idea of the benchmark wealth is immaterial for valuation
in linear market models, it is rarely encountered in works on arbitrage-free valuation, although it
corresponds to the well-known economic concept of opportunity costs. It thus important to make
few comments on its relevance, scope and limitations.
On the one hand, we acknowledge that the idea of unilateral pricing based on an initial portfolio
of a trader can be rejected as unrealistic. It is thus worth stressing that even when we set x1 =
x2 = 0 so that V
0
t (x1) = V
0
t (x2) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], meaning that the initial endowments of
traders are completely ignored, the asymmetry in their respective unilateral prices will show up as
a result of nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics, so that this assumption would not give an essential
simplification of our results and findings.
On the other hand, it would also be possible to assume that each trader is endowed with an
initial portfolio of assets (including also the savings account B0,l and B0,b, which means that he
could be either a borrower or a lender of cash) with the current market value y at time 0 (ignoring
bid-ask spreads and transaction costs). Then V b(y) could represent the wealth process of his static
portfolio. Assume, for instance, that the issuer of an American contract has an initial portfolio of
risky assets, denoted as α0, and cash, denoted as β0, with the (static) terminal values VT (α0) and
V 0T (β0), respectively. Suppose that the risky portfolio α0 is not used for issuer’s hedging purposes but
a (positive or negative) amount x1 from the cash account β0 is used to establish the hedge. Then the
issuer’s benchmark wealth V b(α0, β0) can be defined as V
b
t (α0, β0) := Vt(α0)+V
0
t (β0) for all t ∈ [0, T ]
so that, in particular, the initial wealth of the issuer is equal to y := V b0 (α0, β0) = V0(α0) + V
0
0 (β0).
Then the issuer’s total wealth, inclusive of the price p for the contract Ca entered at time 0 and the
hedging strategy ϕ, equals
Vt(α0, β0, x1, p, ϕ,A) = Vt(α0) + V
0
t (β0 − x1) + Vt(x1 + p, ϕ,A).
where x1 no longer represents the initial wealth of the issuer, but rather the part of the initial cash
endowment used for hedging of Ca. It is clear that it would be more difficult to analyze the case of a
dynamic benchmark portfolio, although in principle this is possible. For the sake of conciseness, we
are not going to study these cases in what follows, but we stress that all results in this work are valid
for any specifications of the benchmark wealth processes for the issuer and the holder, respectively,
since it suffices to assume that they are some G-adapted and ca`dla`g stochastic processes.
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2.2 Unilateral Fair Prices
We consider an extended market model Mp(Ca) in which an American contract Ca is traded at
time 0 at some initial price p where p is an arbitrary real number. We first give a preliminary
analysis of unilateral fair valuation of an American contract by its issuer who is endowed with the
pre-trading initial wealth x1 ∈ R and the corresponding benchmark wealth process V
b(x1).
2.2.1 Issuer’s Fair Prices
We start by introducing the following conditions. Since the process A is fixed throughout, to alleviate
notation, we will frequently write V (x1+p, ϕ) instead of V (x1+p, ϕ,A) when dealing with the issuer.
By the same token, we will later write V (x2 − p, ψ) instead of V (x2 − p, ψ,−A) when examining
trading strategies of the holder.
Definition 2.1. We say that a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T satisfies:
(AO) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτ ≥ V
b
τ (x1) and P
(
Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
τ > V
b
τ (x1)
)
> 0,
(SH) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτ ≥ V
b
τ (x1),
(BGε) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτ ≤ V
b
τ (x1) + ε,
(BE) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτ = V
b
τ (x1),
(NA) ⇐⇒ either Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτ = V
b
τ (x1) or P
(
Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
τ < V
b
τ (x1)
)
> 0.
Let us first explain the meaning of acronyms appearing in Definition 2.1: (AO) stands for arbi-
trage opportunity, (SH) for superhedging, (BG) for bounded gain, (BE) for break-even and (NA) for
no-arbitrage. For a more detailed explanation of each of these properties, see Definitions 2.2–2.6.
For brevity, we write (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ (AO) if a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) satisfies condition (AO); an analogous
convention will be applied to other conditions introduced in Definition 2.1.
If property (SH) is satisfied by a triplet (p, ϕ, τ), then we say that an issuer’s superhedging at time
τ arises. Note that, from the optional section theorem, condition (SH) holds for a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R×
Ψ(x1+p,A) and all τ ∈ T if and only if (p, ϕ) is such that the inequality Vt(x1+p, ϕ)+Xht ≥ V
b
t (x1)
is valid for every t ∈ [0, T ]. This simple observation justifies the following definition of property (SH)
for a pair (p, ϕ).
Definition 2.2. We say that a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p,A) satisfies (SH) (briefly, (p, ϕ) ∈ (SH))
if the inequality Vt(x1 + p, ϕ) + X
h
t ≥ V
b
t (x1) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Then (p, ϕ) is called an
issuer’s superhedging strategy in the extended market Mp(Ca).
Property (AO) of a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) is referred to as the issuer’s strict superhedging (or the issuer’s
arbitrage opportunity) at time τ .
Definition 2.3. We say that a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x1 + p,A) satisfies condition (AO) if a triplet
(p, ϕ, τ) complies with condition (AO) for every τ ∈ T . Then we also say that (p, ϕ) creates an
issuer’s arbitrage opportunity in the extended market Mp(Ca).
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Definition 2.3.
Lemma 2.1. If a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1+ p,A) is such that Vt(x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
t > V
b
t (x1) for every
t ∈ [0, T ], then (p, ϕ) fulfills (AO) and thus an issuer’s arbitrage opportunity arises in the extended
market Mp(Ca).
We say that no issuer’s arbitrage arises for (p, ϕ) at τ if (p, ϕ, τ) satisfies condition (NA). It
readily seen that if a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) fails to satisfy (NA), then it fulfills (AO) and thus an issuer’s
arbitrage opportunity arises at time τ for the issuer’s strategy (p, ϕ). By convention, we henceforth
set inf ∅ =∞ and sup ∅ = −∞. Note that the superscript f stands here for fair and i for issuer.
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Definition 2.4. We say that pf,i(x1, Ca) is an issuer’s fair price for Ca if no issuer’s arbitrage
opportunity (p, ϕ) may arise in Mp(Ca) when p = pf,i(x1, Ca). Hence the set of issuer’s fair prices
equals
Hf,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∀ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)∃ τ ∈ T : (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ (NA)
}
and the upper bound for issuer’s fair prices is given by
pf,i(x1, C
a) := sup
{
p ∈ R | p is an issuer’s fair price for Ca
}
= sup Hf,i(x1). (2)
If the equality pf,i(x1, Ca) = max Hf,i(x1) holds (that is, whenever p
f,i(x1, Ca) ∈ Hf,i(x1)), then
pf,i(x1, C
a) is denoted as p̂f,i(x1, C
a) and called the issuer’s maximum fair price for Ca.
To alleviate notation, the variables (x1, Ca) will be sometimes suppressed and thus we will write
pf,i, pf,i, p̂f,i, etc., rather than pf,i(x1, Ca), p
f,i(x1, Ca), p̂f,i(x1, Ca), etc.
Assumption 2.1. The forward monotonicity property holds: for all x, p ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x + p,A)
and p′ > p (respectively, p′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x + p′, A) such that
Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) ≥ Vt(x+ p, ϕ) (respectively, Vt(x+ p′, ϕ′) ≤ Vt(x + p, ϕ)) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 2.2. Let Assumption 2.1 be satisfied. If p ∈ Hf,i(x1), then for any p′ < p we have that
p′ ∈ Hf,i(x1). Hence if Hf,i(x1) 6= ∅, then either Hf,i(x1) = (−∞, p
f,i ] = (−∞, p̂f,i] for some
pf,i ∈ R or Hf,i(x1) = (−∞, p
f,i) where pf,i ∈ R ∪ {∞}.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. If Hf,i(x1) = ∅, then p
f,i = −∞. Let us now consider the case
where Hf,i(x1) 6= ∅. Assume that p ∈ Hf,i(x1) and a number p′ < p is not an issuer’s fair price.
Then there exists ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1+p′, A) such that (p′, ϕ′, τ) fulfills (AO) for every τ ∈ T . Consequently,
by Assumption 2.1, there exists ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) such that a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) complies with (AO)
for every τ ∈ T . This clearly contradicts the assumption that p belongs to Hf,i(x1) and thus we
conclude that the asserted properties are valid. ✷
The bounded gain condition (BGε) stipulates that issuer’s gains associated with a triplet (p, ϕ, τ)
are bounded from above by ε. It leads to the following definition of an issuer’s superhedging cost
with negligible gain.
Definition 2.5. We say that p ∈ R is an issuer’s superhedging cost with negligible gain for Ca if
for every ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) such that condition (SH) is satisfied by (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x1 + p,A) and
for every ε > 0, there exists a τε ∈ T such that Vτε(x1 + p, ϕ) +Xhτε ≤ V
b
τε(x1) + ε. The set of all
issuer’s superhedging costs with negligible gain for Ca is denoted by Hn,i(x1), that is,
Hn,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∀ (p, ϕ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1+p,A) satisfying (SH)∀ ǫ > 0 ∃ τ
ε ∈ T : (p, ϕ, τε) ∈ (BGε)
}
.
Remark 2.1. Note that the issuer’s superhedging cost with negligible gain is not necessarily unique.
For example, assume that a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1+p,A) satisfies (SH) so that Vτ (x1+p, ϕ)+Xhτ ≥
V bτ (x1) for all τ ∈ T and, in addition, VT−(x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
T− = V
b
T−(x1). It is possible to suppose
that there exists a δ > 0 such that for every ϕ′ ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p+ δ, A) such that (p, ϕ′) ∈ (SH), we
have VT−(x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
T− = VT−(x1 + p+ δ, ϕ
′) +XhT− = V
b
T−(x1) and VT (x1 + p+ δ, ϕ
′) +XhT >
VT (x1 + p, ϕ) +X
h
T . Then it is obvious that both p and p+ δ are issuer’s superhedging costs with
negligible gain.
Let us finally introduce a stopping time related to the break-even condition (BE) introduced in
Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.6. If condition (BE) is satisfied by (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ R× Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T , then a stopping
time τ ∈ T is called an issuer’s break-even time for the pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p,A).
Note that even when the pair (p, ϕ) is fixed, the uniqueness of an issuer’s break-even time τ is
not ensured, in general. Obviously, any issuer’s break-even time can be formally classified as one
of the exercise times available to the holder of Ca but, as we will argue in what follows, an issuer’s
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break-even time is unlikely to also be a rational exercise time for the holder. This is due to the fact
that it may not actually always be advantageous for the holder to exercise at a stopping time that
causes the issuer to break even or prohibits the issuer’s arbitrage opportunities. Firstly, usually the
holder is not informed about the issuer’s trading strategy. Secondly, the holder should be behaving
in a rational way for his own payoff and hedging abilities. A holder’s rational exercise time can be
typically identified with a particular instance of a holder’s break-even time, which is introduced in
Definition 2.8. The earliest issuer’s break-even time will be later denoted as τ∗,i, whereas for the
earliest holder’s rational exercise time we will use the symbol τ∗,h.
2.2.2 Holder’s Fair Prices
Let us now analyze the holder’s fair pricing problem for Ca. We assume that he is endowed with
the pre-trading initial wealth x2 ∈ R and his computation refers to the benchmark wealth process
V b(x2). Recall that we write V (x2−p, ψ) := V (x2−p, ψ,−A) when there is no danger of confusion.
Definition 2.7. We say that (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T satisfy:
(AO′) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ ≥ V
b
τ (x2) and P
(
Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ > V
b
τ (x2)
)
> 0,
(SH′) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ ≥ V
b
τ (x2),
(BL′ε) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−X
h
τ ≥ V
b
τ (x2)− ε,
(BE′) ⇐⇒ Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ = V
b
τ (x2),
(NA′) ⇐⇒ either Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ = V
b
τ (x2) or P
(
Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ < V
b
τ (x2)
)
> 0.
Property (AO′) (respectively, (SH′)) is called the strict superhedging (respectively, superhedging)
condition for the holder. Note that the bounded loss property (BL′ε) means that the holder’s losses
are bounded from below by −ε. Condition (BE′) leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.8. If the equality Vτ ′(x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ ′ = V
b
τ ′(x2) holds, then a stopping time τ
′ ∈ T
is called a holder’s break-even time for the pair (p, ψ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A).
The concept of a holder’s arbitrage opportunity reflects the fact that the holder has the right
to exercise an American contract, that is, to conveniently choose a stopping time τ at which the
contract is settled and terminated. Specifically, a holder’s arbitrage opportunity in Mp(Ca) is a
triplet (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T satisfying condition (AO′).
For a triplet (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R×Ψ(x2−p,−A)×T , we say that no holder’s arbitrage arises for (p, ψ)
at time τ if (p, ψ, τ) fulfills (NA′). It is easily seen that a triplet (p, ψ, τ) ∈ R× Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T
fails to satisfy (AO′) if and only if it satisfies (NA′).
Definition 2.9. We say that pf,h(x2, C
a) is a holder’s fair price for Ca if no holder’s arbitrage
opportunity (p, ψ, τ) may arise in the extended market Mp(Ca) when p = pf,h(x2, Ca). Hence the
set of holder’s fair prices equals
Hf,h(x2) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∀ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (NA
′)
}
and the lower bound for the holder’s fair prices is given by
pf,h(x2, C
a) := inf
{
p ∈ R | p is a holder’s fair price for Ca
}
= inf Hf,h(x2). (3)
If the equality pf,h(x2, Ca) = min Hf,h(x2) holds, then pf,h(x2, Ca) is denoted as p˘f,h(x2, Ca) and
called the holder’s minimum fair price for Ca.
Lemma 2.3. Let Assumption 2.1 be satisfied for −A. If p ∈ Hf,h(x2), then for any p′ > p we have
that p′ ∈ Hf,h(x2). Therefore, if Hf,h(x2) 6= ∅, then either Hf,h(x2) = [ pf,h,∞) = [ p˘f,h,∞) or
Hf,h(x2) = (pf,h,∞).
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Definition 2.10. We say that p ∈ R is a holder’s cost with negligible loss if for every ε > 0 there
exists a pair (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T such that Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)−Xhτ ≥ V
b
τ (x2)− ε. The set of all
holder’s costs with negligible loss for Ca is denoted by Hn,h(x2), that is,
Hn,h(x2) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∀ ǫ > 0 ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (BL
′
ε)
}
.
2.3 Superhedging Costs
The concepts of a (strict) superhedging strategy and the associated cost for the issuer and the
holder are fairly standard. For the issuer, they are based on conditions (SH) and (AO), respectively,
whereas for the holder they hinge on conditions (SH′) and (AO′), respectively. This means that for
the issuer we need to impose some conditions that are valid for every τ ∈ T , whereas for the holder
it suffices to postulate that the analogous conditions are satisfied for some τ ∈ T .
2.3.1 Issuer’s Superhedging Costs
We first introduce the notion of the lower bound for issuer’s strict superhedging costs.
Definition 2.11. The lower bound for issuer’s strict superhedging costs for Ca is given by pa,i(x1, Ca)
:= inf Ha,i(x1) where
Ha,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R : ∃ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) : (p, ϕ) ∈ (AO)
}
.
If the equality pa,i(x1, Ca) = min Ha,i(x1) holds, then it is denoted as p˘a,i(x1, Ca) and called the
issuer’s minimum strict superhedging cost for Ca.
It is readily seen that Ha,i(x1) is the complement of H
f,i(x1) and thus, in view of Lemma 2.2,
the equality pa,i(x1, Ca) = p
f,i(x1, Ca) is satisfied under Assumption 2.1. More precisely, we deal
with the following alternative: either
Hf,i(x1) = (−∞, p̂
f,i ] and Ha,i(x1) = (p
a,i,∞) (4)
or
Hf,i(x1) = (−∞, p
f,i ) and Ha,i(x1) = [ p˘
a,i,∞). (5)
Definition 2.12. The lower bound for issuer’s superhedging costs for Ca is given by ps,i(x1, C
a)
:= inf Hs,i(x1) where
Hs,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R : ∃ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) : (p, ϕ) ∈ (SH)
}
.
If the equality ps,i(x1, Ca) = min Hs,i(x1) holds, then ps,i(x1, Ca) is denoted as p˘s,i(x1, Ca) and
called the issuer’s minimum superhedging cost for Ca.
It is clear that Ha,i(x1) ⊆ Hs,i(x1) and thus ps,i(x1, Ca) ≤ pa,i(x1, Ca). In general, it may occur
that ps,i(x1, Ca) < pa,i(x1, Ca) = p
f,i(x1, Ca). To avoid this problematic situation, we introduce As-
sumption 2.2, which ensures that ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca) and thus also ps,i(x1, Ca) = p
f,i(x1, Ca).
Obviously, Assumption 2.2 is stronger than Assumption 2.1.
Assumption 2.2. The forward strict monotonicity property holds: for all x, p ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x+p,A)
and p′ > p (respectively, p′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x + p′, A) such that
Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) > Vt(x+ p, ϕ) (respectively, Vt(x+ p
′, ϕ′) < Vt(x + p, ϕ)) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 2.4. If Assumption 2.2 is satisfied, then the equality ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca) holds and
thus pf,i(x1, Ca) = ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca).
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Proof. Let us first assume that Hs,i(x1) 6= ∅ or, equivalently, that ps,i(x1, Ca) < ∞ (recall that
inf ∅ = ∞). Since Assumption 2.2 holds, it is clear that for an arbitrary p ∈ Hs,i(x1) and any
ε > 0, there exists a strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p + ε) such that condition (AO) is satisfied by the pair
(p + ε, ϕ′). Hence p + ε belongs to Ha,i(x1) and thus p + ε ≥ pa,i(x1, Ca). From the arbitrariness
of p ∈ Hs,i(x1) and ε > 0, we infer that ps,i(x1, Ca) ≥ pa,i(x1, Ca). From the discussion after
Definition 2.12, we get ps,i(x1, Ca) ≤ pa,i(x1, Ca) and thus ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca). Recalling that
pf,i(x1, C
a) = pa,i(x1, C
a) (see the comments after Definition 2.11), we conclude that pf,i(x1, C
a) =
ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca) if Hs,i(x1) 6= ∅. Let us now assume that Hs,i(x1) = ∅ so that Ha,i(x1) = ∅
as well, since Ha,i(x1) ⊆ Hs,i(x1). Then, on the one hand, ps,i(x1, Ca) = pa,i(x1, Ca) = ∞ and, on
the other hand, pf,i(x1, Ca) =∞, since Hf,i(x1) = R being the complement of Ha,i(x1). Hence the
asserted equalities are satisfied in that case as well. ✷
2.3.2 Holder’s Superhedging Costs
Let us now examine the holder’s strict superhedging costs.
Definition 2.13. The upper bound for holder’s strict superhedging costs for Ca is given by pa,h(x2, C
a)
:= sup Ha,h(x2) where
Ha,h(x2) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (AO
′)
}
.
If the equality pa,h(x2, Ca) = max Ha,h(x2) holds, then p
a,h(x2, Ca) is denoted as p̂a,h(x2, Ca) and
called the holder’s maximum strict superhedging cost for Ca.
It is easily seen that Ha,h(x2) is the complement of H
f,h(x2). Hence we infer from Lemma 2.3
that the equality pa,h(x2, Ca) = pf,h(x2, Ca) is satisfied under Assumption 2.1 and either
Ha,h(x2) = (−∞, p
a,c) and Hf,h(x2) = [ p˘
f,h,∞) (6)
or
Ha,h(x2) = (−∞, p̂
a,c ] and Hf,h(x2) = (p
f,h,∞). (7)
Similarly as for the issuer, we also introduce the concept of a superhedging strategy for the holder.
Definition 2.14. The upper bound for holder’s superhedging costs for Ca equals ps,h(x2, Ca) :=
sup Hs,h(x2) where
Hs,h(x2) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (SH
′)
}
.
If the equality ps,h(x2, Ca) = max Hs,h(x2) holds, then p
s,h(x2, Ca) is denoted as p̂s,h(x2, Ca) and
called the holder’s maximum superhedging cost for Ca.
It is clear that Ha,h(x2) ⊆ Hs,h(x2) and thus the inequality p
s,h(x2, Ca) ≥ p
a,h(x2, Ca) is valid.
Furthermore, Assumption 2.2 ensures that the equality holds.
Lemma 2.5. If Assumption 2.2 is satisfied with −A, then the equality ps,h(x2, Ca) = p
a,h(x2, Ca)
holds and thus pf,h(x2, Ca) = p
s,h(x2, Ca) = p
a,h(x2, Ca).
Proof. Let us first assume that Hs,h(x2) 6= ∅ or, equivalently, that p
s,h(x2, Ca) > −∞. Under
Assumption 2.2, for any p ∈ Hs,h(x2) and ε > 0, there exists a pair (ϕ′, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2−(p−ε))×T such
that (p−ε, ϕ′, τ) satisfy condition (AO′), that is, p−ε ∈ Ha,h(x2) and thus p−ε ≤ p
a,h(x2, C
a). Since
p ∈ Hs,h(x2) and ε > 0 are arbitrary, we conclude that p
s,h(x2, Ca) ≤ p
a,h(x2, Ca). The inequality
ps,h(x2, Ca) ≤ p
a,h(x2, Ca) is always satisfied and thus p
s,h(x2, Ca) = p
a,h(x2, Ca) = pf,h(x2, Ca)
where the last equality is known to hold under Assumption 2.1. Let us now assume thatHs,h(x2) = ∅.
Then, on the one hand, ps,h(x2, Ca) = p
a,h(x2, Ca) = −∞ since Ha,h(x2) ⊆ Hs,h(x2) and, on the
other hand, pf,h(x2, C
a) = −∞ since Hf,h(x2) is the complement of H
a,h(x2). Hence the asserted
equalities are valid in that case as well. ✷
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2.4 Unilateral Acceptable Prices
Our next goal is to analyze the following problem: under which assumptions a suitably defined
replication cost of an American contract is also its maximum (respectively, minimum) fair price
for the issuer (respectively, the holder). The answer to this question will lead us to the crucially
important concept of unilateral acceptable prices computed by the counterparties.
2.4.1 Issuer’s Acceptable Price
We will now study the concept of replication of the contract Ca by the issuer. We work hereafter
under Assumption 2.2 and thus, in view of Lemma 2.4, we have that
pf,i(x1, C
a) = ps,i(x1, C
a) = pa,i(x1, C
a). (8)
Definition 2.15. The lower bound for issuer’s replication costs for Ca is given by pr,i(x1, Ca)
:= inf Hr,i(x1) where
Hr,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T : (p, ϕ) ∈ (SH) & (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ (BE)
}
.
If the equality pr,i(x1, Ca) = min Hr,i(x1) holds, then pr,i(x1, Ca) is denoted as p˘r,i(x1, Ca) and called
the issuer’s minimum replication cost for Ca.
Note that in Definition 2.15 we focus on a particular issuer’s superhedging strategy for which a
break-even time exists and we do not impose any restrictions on wealth processes of other trading
strategies available to the issuer. Hence, in principle, for p ∈ Hr,i(x1), it may happen that there
exists another pair, say (p, ψ), which is an issuer’s strict superhedging strategy. This would mean
that the issuer’s replication cost is not an issuer’s fair price for Ca. To eliminate this shortcoming
of Definition 2.15, in the next definition we impose, in addition, the no-arbitrage condition (NA) on
all issuer’s trading strategies associated with p.
Definition 2.16. The lower bound for issuer’s fair replication costs for Ca is given by pf,r,i(x1, Ca) :=
inf Hf,r,i(x1) where
Hf,r,i(x1) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ϕ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)× T : (p, ϕ) ∈ (SH) & (p, ϕ, τ) ∈ (BE);
∀ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A)∃ τ
′ ∈ T : (p, ϕ′, τ ′) ∈ (NA)
}
.
If the equality pf,r,i(x1, Ca) = min Hf,r,i(x1) holds, then pf,r,i(x1, Ca) is denoted as p˘f,r,i(x1, Ca)
and called the issuer’s minimum fair replication cost for Ca.
Definition 2.17. If the set Hf,r,i(x1) is a singleton, then its unique element is denoted as p
i(x1, C
a)
and called the issuer’s acceptable price.
Obviously, if pi(x1, Ca) is well defined, then it coincides with p˘f,r,i(x1, Ca). Let us examine some
useful relationships between the conditions introduced in Definition 2.1.
Lemma 2.6. (i) If (p, ϕ) satisfy (SH) and (p, ϕ, τ) satisfy (NA), then (BE) is valid for (p, ϕ, τ).
(ii) If (p, ϕ) fail to satisfy (SH), then there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ) satisfy (NA).
(iii) The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) for any (p, ϕ) satisfying (SH) there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ) satisfy (BE),
(b) for any (p, ϕ), there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ) satisfy (NA).
Proof. (i) The statement is an almost immediate consequence of definitions of conditions (SH),
(NA) and (BE). Indeed, suppose that a pair (p, ϕ) satisfies (SH) and a triplet (p, ϕ, τ) complies with
(NA). Clearly, the inequality P(Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) + X
h
τ < V
b
τ (x1)) > 0 cannot hold and thus (p, ϕ, τ)
must satisfy (BE).
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(ii) We know that if a pair (p, ϕ) satisfies (AO), then it fulfills (SH) and thus if (p, ϕ) fails to satisfy
(SH), then condition (AO) is not met. Recalling that, in essence, the class of pairs (p, ϕ) satisfying
(AO) is the complement of (NA), we conclude that there exists a stopping time τ ∈ T such that the
triplet (p, ϕ, τ) complies with (NA).
(iii) We first show that (a) implies (b). We know from (ii) that if a pair (p, ϕ) does not satisfy
condition (SH), then there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ) complies with (NA). If (p, ϕ) satisfies
(SH) then, from condition (a), there exists τ ∈ T such that the triplet (p, ϕ, τ) fulfills (BE), and thus
it also satisfies (NA). Let us now assume that condition (b) is met. Then, from part (i), condition
(a) holds as well. ✷
In view of (8), the proof of the following lemma is obvious and thus it is omitted.
Lemma 2.7. We have that Hs,i(x1) ⊇ Hr,i(x1) ⊇ Hf,r,i(x1) = Hf,i(x1) ∩Hr,i(x1) and thus
pf,i = ps,i ≤ pr,i ≤ pf,r,i. (9)
In the next result, we study the basic properties of issuer’s costs.
Proposition 2.1. (i) If Hf,r,i(x1) 6= ∅, then it is a singleton and the issuer’s acceptable price
pi = pi(x1, Ca) satisfies
−∞ < pi = p̂f,i = p˘r,i = p˘s,i < +∞. (10)
(ii) If Hr,i(x1) 6= ∅, then p
f,i = ps,i ≤ pr,i <∞.
(iii) If Hr,i(x1) = ∅, then p
f,i = ps,i ≤ pr,i =∞.
Proof. We start by proving (i). If Hf,r,i(x1) 6= ∅, then from the inclusion Hf,r,i(x1) ⊆ Hf,i(x1)
we obtain the inequality pf,r,i ≤ pf,i and thus, in view of (9), we have pf,i = ps,i = pr,i = pf,r,i.
Moreover, Hf,i(x1) 6= ∅ and H
s,i(x1) 6= ∅ and thus p
f,i > −∞ and ps,i < ∞. We conclude that
−∞ < pf,i = pr,i = pf,r,i = ps,i < ∞. From the inclusion Hf,r,i(x1) ⊆ Hf,i(x1) and the equalities
sup Hf,i(x1) = p
f,i = pf,r,i = inf Hf,r,i(x1), we deduce that for arbitrary p1, p2 ∈ Hf,r,i(x1) and
p3 ∈ H
f,i(x1) we have p1 = p2 ≥ p3 and thus H
f,r,i(x1) is a singleton and its unique element
is not less than any element of Hf,i(x1). Consequently, p̂f,i and pi are well defined and satisfy
−∞ < p̂f,i = pi < +∞. Furthermore, Hf,r,i(x1) ⊆ Hr,i(x1) and thus the equality pi = pr,i
implies that p˘r,i exists as well and coincides with pi. We conclude that (10) is valid. This means,
in particular, that Hf,i(x1) = (−∞, p̂f,i] = (−∞, p˘r,i] = (−∞, pi]. Parts (ii) and (iii) are easy
consequences of (9). ✷
Remark 2.2. Part (i) in Proposition 2.1 shows that if there exists a number p for which an issuer’s
fair replicating strategy exists and p is the unique issuer’s acceptable price, his maximum fair price,
minimum replication cost, and the infimum of (strict) superhedging costs (but, obviously, it is not
a strict superhedging cost). We thus deal here with a highly desirable situation but, sadly, it is not
easy to check whether a number p with above-mentioned properties exists. As expected, to overcome
this difficulty we will impose additional assumptions on wealth processes of trading strategies. Recall
that in the complete linear market, one can show thatHr,i(x1) 6= ∅ but, to the best of our knowledge,
the properties of the set Hf,r,i(x1) have not been studied in the existing literature.
2.4.2 Holder’s Acceptable Price
We postulate that Assumption 2.2 is satisfied with −A and thus, in view of Lemma 2.5, we have
that
pf,h(x2, C
a) = ps,h(x2, C
a) = pa,h(x2, C
a). (11)
The notion of the holder’s replication cost introduced is through the following definition.
Definition 2.18. The upper bound for holder’s replication costs for Ca is given by pr,h(x2, Ca)
:= sup Hr,h(x2) where
Hr,h(x2) =
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (BE
′)
}
.
12 E. Kim, T. Nie and M. Rutkowski
Equivalently,
pr,h(x2, C
a) := − inf
{
q ∈ R | ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 + q,−A)× T : Vτ (x2 + q, ψ)−X
h
τ = V
b
τ (x2)
}
.
If the equality pr,h(x2, Ca) = max Hr,h(x2) holds, then p
r,h(x2, Ca) is denoted as p̂r,h(x2, Ca) and
called the holder’s maximum replication cost for Ca.
To establish the existence of the holder’s acceptable price, we will use the concept of the holder’s
fair replication costs.
Definition 2.19. The upper bound for holder’s fair replication costs for Ca is given by pf,r,h(x2, Ca) =
sup Hf,r,h(x2) where
Hf,r,h(x2) :=
{
p ∈ R | ∃ (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ, τ) ∈ (BE
′) &
∀ (ψ′, τ ′) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A)× T : (p, ψ
′, τ ′) ∈ (NA′)
}
.
If pf,r,h(x2, Ca) = max Hf,r,h(x2), then p
f,r,h(x2, Ca) is denoted as p̂f,r,h(x2, Ca) and called the
holder’s maximum fair replication cost for Ca.
Definition 2.20. If the setHf,r,h(x2) is a singleton, then its unique element is denoted as ph(x2, Ca)
and called the holder’s acceptable price.
Notice that if ph(x2, Ca) is well defined, then it is equal to p̂f,r,h(x2, Ca). The following lemma is
an easy consequence of Definition 2.7.
Lemma 2.8. (i) If (p, ψ, τ) satisfy (BE′), then they satisfy (SH′).
(ii) If (p, ψ, τ) satisfy (SH′) and (NA′), then they satisfy (BE′).
(iii) If (p, ψ, τ) do not satisfy (SH′), then they satisfy (NA′).
We infer from Lemma 2.8 that Hs,h(x2) ⊇ Hr,h(x2) ⊇ Hf,r,h(x2) = Hr,h(x2) ∩ Hf,h(x2) and
thus, in view of (11), we have
pf,h = ps,h ≥ pr,h ≥ pf,r,h. (12)
Proposition 2.2. (i) If Hf,r,h(x2) 6= ∅, then it is a singleton and the holder’s acceptable price
ph = ph(x2, Ca) satisfies
−∞ < ph = p˘f,h = p̂r,h = p̂s,h < +∞. (13)
(ii) If Hr,h(x2) 6= ∅, then −∞ < p
r,h ≤ pf,h = ps,h.
(iii) If Hr,h(x2) = ∅, then −∞ = p
r,h ≤ pf,h = ps,h.
Proof. It is clear that Hf,r,h(x2) ⊆ Hf,h(x2) and thus if Hf,r,h(x2) 6= ∅, then p
f,r,h < +∞ and
pf,r,h ≥ pf,h. Furthermore, the sets Hs,h(x2) and Hr,h(x2) are nonempty and thus we infer from
(12) that −∞ < pf,h = pr,h = pf,r,h = ps,h <∞. From the inclusion Hf,r,h(x2) ⊆ Hf,h(x2) and the
equalities inf Hf,h(x2) = pf,h = p
f,r,h = sup Hf,r,h(x2), we see that for arbitrary p1, p2 ∈ Hf,r,h(x2)
and p3 ∈ Hf,h(x2) we have p1 = p2 ≤ p3 and thus Hf,r,h(x2) is a singleton and its unique element
is less than any element of Hf,h(x2). Consequently, p˘f,h and ph are well defined and they satisfy
−∞ < ph = p˘f,h < +∞. Furthermore,Hf,r,h(x2) ⊆ Hr,h(x2) and thus the equality ph = p
r,h implies
that p̂r,h exists and coincides with ph. We conclude that (13) is valid. The proofs of statements (ii)
and (iii) are straightforward in view of (12). ✷
3 Unilateral Pricing Through Reflected BSDEs
The goal of this section is to re-examine and extend a BSDE approach to the valuation of American
options in nonlinear market, which was initiated in the paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11]. Our main
goal is to show that unilateral acceptable prices for an American contract Ca can be characterized in
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terms of solutions to reflected BSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional continuous semimartingale S.
In this section, we postulate that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) satisfies the forward equation
Vt = y −
∫ t
0
g(u, Vu, ξu) du+
∫ t
0
ξu dSu +At, (14)
where y ∈ R represents the initial wealth at time 0 of a given trading strategy ξ (recall that A0 = 0).
By applying Lemma 3.1 with y1 = x + p < x + p
′ = y2, f1 = f2 = g and z = ξ, it is easy to check
that Assumption 2.2 is met when the dynamics of the wealth process are given by the SDE (14) and
are uniquely specified by the initial value y and the process ξ (for instance, when g = g(t, v, z) is
Lipschitz continuous with respect to v).
3.1 Dynamics of the Wealth Process
Let us first describe more explicitly the main features of the mechanism of nonlinear trading, which
underpins the wealth dynamics given by (14). We start by introducing the notation for traded assets,
that is, cash accounts, risky assets, and funding accounts associated with risky assets. It should be
stressed, however, that our further developments will not depend on the choice of a particular model
for primary assets and trading arrangements and thus our general results are capable of covering a
broad spectrum of market models.
Let S = (S1, . . . , Sd) stand for the collection of prices of a family of d risky assets where the
processes S1, . . . , Sd are continuous semimartingales. Continuous processes of finite variation, de-
noted as B0,l and B0,b, represent the lending borrowing unsecured cash accounts, respectively. For
every j = 1, 2, . . . , d, we denote by Bj,l (respectively, Bj,b) the lending (respectively, borrowing)
funding account associated with the ith risky asset, and also assumed to be continuous processes
of finite variation. The financial interpretation of these accounts varies from case to case (for more
details, see [5, 6]). Let us denote by B the collection of all cash and funding accounts available to
a trader. For simplicity of presentation, we maintain our assumption that the issuer and the holder
have identical market conditions but it is clear that this assumption is not relevant for our further
developments and thus it can be easily relaxed. A trading strategy is an R3d+2-valued, G-adapted
process ϕ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd;ψ0,l, ψ0,b, . . . , ψd,l, ψd,b) where the components represent all outstanding
positions in the risky assets Sj , j = 1, 2, . . . , d, cash accounts B0,l, B0,b, and funding accounts
Bj,l, Bj,b, j = 1, 2, . . . , d for risky assets.
Definition 3.1. We say that a trading strategy (y, ϕ) is self-financing for Ca and we write ϕ ∈
Ψ(y,A) if the wealth process V (y, ϕ,A), which is given by
Vt(y, ϕ,A) =
d∑
j=1
ξjtS
j
t +
d∑
j=0
ψj,lt B
j,l
t +
d∑
j=0
ψj,bt B
j,b
t ,
satisfies, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Vt(y, ϕ,A) = y +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ξju dS
j
u +
d∑
j=0
∫ t
0
ψj,lu dB
j,l
u +
d∑
j=0
∫ t
0
ψj,bu dB
j,b
u +At
subject to additional constraints imposed on the components of ϕ. In particular, we postulate that
ψj,lt ≥ 0, ψ
j,b
t ≤ 0 and ψ
j,l
t ψ
j,b
t = 0 for all j = 0, 1, . . . , d and t ∈ [0, T ].
Due to additional trading constraints, which depend on the particular trading mechanism, the
choice of an initial value y and a process ξ is known to uniquely specify the wealth process of a self-
financing strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,A). In addition, one needs also to introduce some form of admissibility
of trading strategies and to postulate that the market model M = (B,S,Ψ(A)) where the class
Ψ(A) = ∪y∈RΨ(y,A) of all admissible trading strategies is arbitrage-free in a suitable sense, for
instance, the market model M can be assumed to be regular, in the sense of Bielecki et al. [5].
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Since the arbitrage-free feature of a nonlinear market was studied in El Karoui and Quenez [18]
and, more recently, Bielecki et al. [5, 6], we do not elaborate on this issue here and we refer the
interested reader to these works. It is important to notice that, due to the trading constraints,
differential funding costs and possibly also some additional adjustment processes, which are not
explicitly stated in Definition 3.1, the dynamics of the wealth process are nonlinear, in general. We
refer the reader to Bielecki et al. [5, 6] for more encompassing versions of the self-financing property
of a trading strategy (see, for instance, Definition 4.5 in [6] or Definition 2.2 in [5]) and to Nie and
Rutkowski [38, 39, 40, 41] for explicit examples of nonlinear models with trading constraints and
adjustments (in particular, the collateralization of contracts). We only observe that each particular
trading arrangement gives rise to an explicit mapping g in the dynamics (14) of the wealth, which
is sometimes quite complex, but at the same time usually fairly regular.
The following elementary lemma addresses the issue of the (strict) monotonicity of the wealth
process driven by (14). Note that since the process z is assumed to be given in the statement of
Lemma 3.1, we may interpret the SDE (15) as a deterministic integral equation, which holds for
almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma 3.1. Let gj : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R, j = 1, 2 be P ⊗ B(R) ⊗ B(Rd)/B(R)-measurable.
Consider the SDEs for j = 1, 2
vjt = yj −
∫ t
0
gj(u, v
j
u, zu) du+ k
j
t +
∫ t
0
zu dSu +Ht, (15)
where z is an Rd-valued, G-progressively measurable stochastic process, the G-adapted process k =
k1−k2 is nondecreasing with k0 = 0, S is an Rd-valued semimartingale, and H is a ca`dla`g, G-adapted
process. Assume that (15) has a unique solution vj for j = 1, 2. If g1(t, v
2
t , zt) ≤ g2(t, v
2
t , zt), dt⊗dP-
a.e. and y1 ≥ y2 (respectively, y1 > y2), then v1t ≥ v
2
t (respectively, v
1
t > v
2
t ) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. If we set v¯t := v
1
t − v
2
t for all t ∈ [0, T ], then v¯ is easily seen to satisfy
v¯t = y1 − y2 +
∫ t
0
(
g2(u, v
2
u, zu)− g1(u, v
1
u, zu)
)
du+ kt
= y1 − y2 +
∫ t
0
(
λuv¯u + g2(u, v
2
u, zu)− g1(u, v
2
u, zu)
)
du+ kt
where λu :=
(
g1(u, v
2
u, zu)− g1(u, v
1
u, zu)
)
(v¯u)
−1
1{v1
u
6=v2
u
}. Thus
d
(
e−
∫
t
0
λu duv¯t
)
= e−
∫
t
0
λu du
(
(g2(t, v
2
t , zt)− g1(t, v
2
t , zt)) dt+ dkt
)
.
After integrating both sides from 0 to t, and noticing that the process k = k1 − k2 is nondecreasing
and e−
∫
t
0
λu du > 0, we obtain the inequality
v¯t ≥ v¯0 e
∫
t
0
λu du +
∫ t
0
e
∫
t
s
λu du
(
g2(s, v
2
s , zs)− g1(s, v
2
s , zs)
)
ds
from which the assertion of the lemma follows. ✷
3.2 Comparison Properties of Nonlinear Evaluations
We henceforth postulate that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) is governed by the SDE (14) where
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd) is given and the mapping g satisfies some additional assumptions. This will allow us
to refer to a large body of existing literature on the theory of BSDEs and, in particular, to exploit the
link between reflected BSDEs and solutions to nonlinear optimal stopping problems (see, for instance,
Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [9], Dumitrescu et al. [10], El Karoui et al. [15], Grigorova and Quenez [22],
Grigorova et al. [20, 21], and Quenez and Sulem [45]). Our goal in this section is to examine
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the valuation and hedging of American contracts for the special case where the wealth dynamics
are driven by (14). To keep our presentation concise and encompassing several alternative nonlinear
market models, we will directly postulate that the associated BSDEs enjoy desirable properties, such
as: the existence, uniqueness, and the strict comparison property for solutions to BSDEs, which are
known to hold under various circumstances. As was already mentioned, a particular instance of a
market model given by (14) has been studied in a recent paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11].
We will use the standard terminology related to nonlinear evaluations generated by solutions to
BSDEs (see, e.g., Chapter 3 in Peng [42] or Section 4 in Peng [43]). Consider the following BSDE
on [0, s]
Yt = ζs +
∫ s
t
g(u, Yu, Zu) du −
∫ s
t
Zu dMu − (Hs −Ht), (16)
where ζs ∈ L2(Gs), M is a d-dimensional martingale, the process H is real-valued and G-adapted,
and the generator g : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R is P ⊗ B(R) ⊗ B(Rd)/B(R)-measurable where P
is the σ-field of predictable sets on Ω × [0, T ]. Assume that the BSDE (16) has a unique solution
(Y, Z) in a suitable space of stochastic processes (see, e.g., [7, 39]). For every 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T and
ζs ∈ L
2(Gs), we denote E
g,H
t,s (ζs) = Yt where (Y, Z) solves the BSDE (16) with Ys = ζs. Then the
system of operators Eg,Ht,s : L
2(Gs) → L2(Gt) is called the Eg,H-evaluation. It is worth noting that
a deterministic dates t ≤ s appearing in the BSDE (16) can be replaced by arbitrary G-stopping
times τ ≤ σ from T and thus the notion of the Eg,H -evaluation can be extended to stopping times
Eg,Hτ,σ : L
2(Gσ)→ L2(Gτ ). The concept of the (strict) comparison property is of great importance in
the theory of BSDEs and nonlinear evaluations.
Definition 3.2. We say that the comparison property of Eg,H holds if for every stopping time
τ ∈ T and random variables ζ1τ , ζ
2
τ ∈ L
2(Gτ ), the following property is valid: if ζ1τ ≥ ζ
2
τ then
Eg,H0,τ (ζ
1
τ ) ≥ E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
2
τ ). We say that the strict comparison property of E
g,H holds if for every τ ∈ T
and ζ1τ , ζ
2
τ ∈ L
2(Gτ ) if ζ1τ ≥ ζ
2
τ and ζ
1
τ 6= ζ
2
τ then E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
1
τ ) > E
g,H
0,τ (ζ
2
τ ).
In view of its financial interpretation, the nonlinear evaluation Eg,A associated with the BSDE
Yt = ζs +
∫ s
t
g(u, Yu, Zu) du −
∫ s
t
Zu dSu − (As −At) (17)
is henceforth denoted by Eg,i and called the issuer’s g-evaluation. In Section 3.3, we address the
issuer’s pricing problem and we work under the following standing assumption.
Assumption 3.1. We postulate that:
(i) the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ,A) of a trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y,A) satisfies (14),
(ii) for any fixed y ∈ R and any process ξ such that the stochastic integral in (14) is well defined,
the SDE (14) has a unique strong solution,
(iii) the strict monotonicity property holds for the wealth V (y, ϕ,A) (see Assumption 2.2),
(iv) for every (s, ζs) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(Gs) the BSDE (17) has a unique solution (Y, Z) on [0, s].
Note that in Section 3.5, where we study the holder’s pricing problem, we will use a modified
version of Assumption 3.1 in which the process A is replaced by −A.
Remark 3.1. In view of Lemma 3.1 and condition (ii) in Assumption 3.1, condition (iii) in As-
sumption 3.1 is not restrictive, since it is satisfied for every generator g. For explicit assumptions
about g ensuring that the BSDE (17), where S is a multi-dimensional, continuous, square-integrable
martingale enjoying the predictable representation property, has a unique solution and the strict
comparison property of the issuer’s g-evaluation Eg,i holds, see Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 in Nie and
Rutkowski [39].
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3.3 Issuer’s Acceptable Price via RBSDE
We denote by X := V b(x1)−Xh the issuer’s relative reward and we assume that the process X is
square-integrable. Then, by Assumption 3.1(iv), the following BSDE on [0, T ]
Yt = XT +
∫ T
t
g(u, Yu, Zu) du−
∫ T
t
Zu dSu − (AT −At) (18)
has a unique solution (Y, Z) in a suitable space of stochastic processes. To study the issuer’s pricing
problem for an American contract Ca, we make the following assumption (see, e.g., Definition 2.4 in
Quenez and Sulem [45]).
Assumption 3.2. The reflected BSDE with the lower obstacle X{
dYt = −g(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt − dKt,
YT = XT , Yt ≥ Xt,
∫ T
0
(Yt −Xt) dKct = 0, ∆K
d
t = −∆(Yt −At)1{Yt−=Xt−},
(19)
has a unique solution (Y, Z,K) where K is a G-predictable, ca`dla`g, nondecreasing process such that
K0 = 0 and K = K
c +Kd is its unique decomposition into continuous and jump components.
Reflected BSDEs were introduced in seminal papers by El Karoui et al. [16, 15] where they
were applied to solutions of optimal stopping problems and pricing of American options. They
were subsequently studied by several authors who dealt with various frameworks, to mention a few:
Aazizi and Ouknine [1], Baadi and Ouknine [2], Cre´pey and Matoussi [8], Essaky [19], Hamade`ne [23],
Hamade`ne and Ouknine [24], Grigorova et al. [20, 21], Klimsiak [32, 33], Klimsiak et al. [35] and
Quenez and Sulem [45]. They have shown that Assumption 3.2 is met in many instances of our
interest but, due to space limitations, we are not going to quote any particular result here.
It is worth stressing that we deliberately do not specify particular spaces of stochastic processes
in which the components Y and Z are searched for, since our further results do not depend on the
choice of these spaces. Only the properties of the process K in a unique solution (Y, Z,K) to the
issuer’s RBSDE (19) (and, by the same token, of the process k in a unique solution (y, z, k) to the
holder’s RBSDE (30)) are essential in what follows and thus they are stated explicitly and analyzed
in some detail.
Definition 3.3. We say that vi(Ca) ∈ R is the value of the issuer’s optimal stopping problem for
Ca if
vi(Ca) = sup
τ∈T
Eg,i0,τ (Xτ ).
A stopping time τ∗ ∈ T is called a solution to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem if vi(Ca) = v̂i(Ca)
where
v̂i(Ca) := Eg,i0,τ∗(Xτ∗) = max
τ∈T
Eg,i0,τ (Xτ ). (20)
Assumption 3.3. The value vi(Ca) to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem exists and satisfies
vi(Ca) = Y0.
Assumption 3.4. The stopping time τ i := inf {t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = Xt} is a (not necessarily unique)
solution to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem so that v̂i(Ca) = Eg,i0,τ i(Xτ i).
Remark 3.2. Various results pertaining to Assumptions 3.2–3.4 were obtained under alternative
assumptions on the generator g and the processes X and S in (19) by, among others, El Karoui et
al. [15], Grigorova et al. [20] and Quenez and Sulem [45]. Although it is common to set S = W
and A = 0, an extension to a more general situation is also feasible when the generator g satisfies a
suitable Lipschitz-type condition (see [39] for the case of a BSDE without reflection).
The first main result in this section is the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. Let Assumptions 3.1–3.4 be satisfied and let (Y, Z,K) be the unique solution to the
issuer’s reflected BSDE (19). Then the following assertions are valid:
(i) if Eg,i has the strict comparison property, then
p˘r,i(x1, C
a) = p˘s,i(x1, C
a) = Y0 − x1 = E
g,i
0,τ i(Xτ i)− x1 = v̂
i(Ca)− x1 (21)
and (p′, ϕ′, τ ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z, τ i) is an issuer’s replicating strategy for Ca,
(ii) if Eg,i has the strict comparison property, then the issuer’s acceptable price for Ca equals
pi(x1, Ca) = Y0 − x1 = v̂i(Ca)− x1.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is split into three steps, which are formulated as Propositions 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3. ✷
We start by analyzing the issuer’s minimum superhedging cost (note that Assumption 3.4 is not
postulated in Proposition 3.1).
Proposition 3.1. If Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are satisfied and Eg,i has the comparison property, then
the issuer’s minimum superhedging cost is well defined and satisfies
p˘s,i(x1, C
a) = vi(Ca)− x1 = Y0 − x1, (22)
where (Y, Z,K) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (19).
Proof. We first prove that ps,i ≤ Y0 − x1. It suffices to show that for the initial value p′ := Y0 − x1,
where Y0 is obtained from the reflected BSDE (19), we can find an issuer’s superhedging strategy,
that is, there exists a trading strategy ϕ′ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p′, A) such that Vt(x1 + p′, ϕ′) ≥ Xt for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. To this end, we set (p′, ϕ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z) where (Y, Z,K) is the unique solution to the
reflected BSDE (19). Then, on the one hand, the value process V = V (x1 + p
′, ϕ′) is a unique
strong solution (by Assumption 3.1(ii)) to the following SDE where the initial value V0 = Y0 and
the process Z are fixed
dVt = −g(t, Vt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt. (23)
On the other hand, if (Y, Z,K) solves the reflected BSDE (19), then the process Y˜ = Y can also be
seen as a unique strong solution to the following SDE
dY˜t = −g(t, Y˜t, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt − dKt, (24)
where, once again, the initial value Y˜0 = Y0 and the processes Z and K are given. Therefore, from
Lemma 3.1 with g1 = g2 = g we infer that Vt ≥ Y˜t = Yt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since Yt ≥ Xt for all
t ∈ [0, T ], we conclude that Vt ≥ Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, (x1 + p′, ϕ′) = (Y0, Z) is an
issuer’s superhedging strategy and thus ps,i ≤ Y0 − x1.
We will now show that ps,i ≥ Y0 − x1. Let us consider an arbitrary p ∈ R for which there exists
ϕ ∈ Ψ(x1 + p,A) such that (p, ϕ) satisfy (SH). If we can show that x1 + p ≥ Y0, then the inequality
ps,i ≥ Y0 − x1 will hold by the definition of the lower bound ps,i. To this end, we observe that
Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ Xτ for every τ ∈ T since, by Definition 2.2, we have that Vt(x1 + p, ϕ) ≥ Xt for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, by applying the mapping Eg,i to both sides and using the comparison
property of Eg,i, we obtain
x1 + p = E
g,i
0,τ (Vτ (x1 + p, ϕ)) ≥ E
g,i
0,τ (Xτ ).
Since τ ∈ T is arbitrary, we conclude that x1+p ≥ supτ∈T E
g,i
0,τ (Xτ ) = v
i(Ca) = Y0 where the second
equality follows from Assumption 3.3. Hence ps,i ≥ Y0 − x1 and thus we conclude that the equality
ps,i = Y0 − x1 is valid.
Finally, from the first part of the proof, we know that for p′ = Y0 − x1 there exists a trading
strategy ϕ′ = Z ∈ Ψ(x1 + p′, A) such that Vt(x1 + p′, ϕ′) ≥ Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ] so that Y0 − x1 ∈
Hs,i(x1). Consequently, we have that ps,i(x1, Ca) = p˘s,i(x1, Ca) = Y0 − x1. ✷
Consider the solution (Y, Z,K) and the pair (Y0, Z) introduced in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
In the next result, we examine the existence of an issuer’s replicating strategy for Ca.
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Proposition 3.2. If Assumptions 3.1–3.4 are satisfied and Eg,i has the strict comparison property,
then the following assertions are valid:
(i) the pair (Y0 − x1, Z) is an issuer’s replicating strategy for Ca and τ i is an issuer’s break-even
time for the pair (Y0 − x1, Z),
(ii) the issuer’s minimum superhedging and replication costs satisfy
p˘r,i(x1, C
a) = p˘s,i(x1, C
a) = Y0 − x1 = E
g,i
0,τ i(Xτ i)− x1 = v̂
i(Ca)− x1. (25)
Proof. From Lemma 2.7 and Proposition 3.1, we already know that Y0 − x1 = ps,i = pˇs,i ≤ pr,i and
thus to establish the equality p˘r,i(x1, C
a) = p˘s,i(x1, C
a), it is enough to show that the trading strategy
(p′, ϕ′) = (Y0 − x1, Z), which is already known to be an issuer’s superhedging strategy, is also an
issuer’s replicating strategy for Ca. We first note that the definition of τ i and the right-continuity
of the processes X and Y yield the equality Xτ i = Yτ i . Consequently, we have that
Y0 = v̂
i(Ca) = Eg,i0,τ i(Xτ i) = E
g,i
0,τ i(Yτ i),
where the first two equalities follow from Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4. We will now show that Kτ i = 0.
Since (Y, Z,K) solves the reflected BSDE (19), we also know that
Y0 = Yτ i +
∫ τ i
0
g(u, Yu, Zu) du−
∫ τ i
0
Zu dSu −Aτ i +Kτ i.
Therefore, Y0 = E
g,i
0,τ i(Yτ i +Kτ i) and thus E
g,i
0,τ i(Yτ i) = E
g,i
0,τ i(Yτ i +Kτ i). From the strict comparison
property of Eg,i, we conclude that Kτ i = 0 and thus, for all t ∈ [0, τ
i],
Yt = Y0 −
∫ t
0
g(u, Yu, Zu) du+
∫ t
0
Zu dSu +At.
Finally, using the equality V0(Y0, Z) = Y0 and the postulated uniqueness of a solution to the SDE
(23) (see Assumption 3.1(ii)), we obtain the equality Vt(Y0, Z) = Yt on [0, τ
i] and thus, in particular,
Vτ i(Y0, Z) = Yτ i = Xτ i. We have thus shown that τ
i is an issuer’s break-even time for the pair
(Y0 − x1, Z). We have thus shown that the pair (p′, ϕ′) = (Y0, Z) is an issuer’s replicating strategy
for Ca. ✷
The final step in establishing Theorem 3.1 and hence providing a solution to the issuer’s valuation
problem hinges on showing that the issuer’s acceptable price is also the issuer’s maximum fair price.
Proposition 3.3. If Assumptions 3.1–3.4 are satisfied and Eg,i has the strict comparison property,
then the issuer’s acceptable price pi(x1, Ca) is well defined and
pi(x1, C
a) = p̂f,i(x1, C
a) = p˘r,i(x1, C
a) = p˘s,i(x1, C
a). (26)
Proof. It suffices to show that p˘r,i belongs to Hf,i(x1) or, equivalently, that p˘r,i < p for every
p ∈ Ha,i(x1) (recall that Ha,i(x1) is the complement of Hf,i(x1)). To this end, we will argue by
contradiction. Assume that p˘r,i ∈ Ha,i(x1) so that there exists a strategy ϕ˘ ∈ Ψ(x1+ p˘r,i) such that
(p˘r,i, ϕ˘) satisfy (AO). Then we have, for every τ ∈ T ,
P
(
Vτ (x1 + p˘
r,i, ϕ˘) ≥ Xτ
)
= 1 and P
(
Vτ (x1 + p˘
r,i, ϕ˘) > Xτ
)
> 0.
Let us now take τ = τ i. By applying the mapping Eg,i to both sides, we obtain
x1 + p˘
r,i = Eg,i0,τ i
(
Vτ i(x1 + p˘
r,i, ϕ˘)
)
> Eg,i0,τ i(Xτ i) = x1 + p˘
r,i,
where the last equality comes from Proposition 3.2. This is a contradiction and thus we have shown
that p˘r,i is not in Ha,i(x1). Recall that either Ha,i(x1) = [pa,i,∞) or Ha,i(x1) = (pa,i,∞) and we
claim that in fact the latter case is true. Indeed, from Assumption 3.1, Lemma 2.4 and Proposition
3.2, we have p˘r,i = p˘s,i = pa,i and, since p˘r,i is not in Ha,i(x1), we have that Ha,i(x1) = (pa,i,∞).
Obviously, p˘r,i < p for every p ∈ Ha,i(x1) and thus p˘
r,i belongs to Hf,i(x1) meaning that the set
Hf,r,i(x1) is nonempty. All equalities in (26) now follow from Proposition 2.1. ✷
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3.4 Issuer’s Break-Even Times
In Section 3.4, we postulate that the assumptions of Theorem 3.1(ii) are satisfied and the contract
Ca is traded at time 0 at the issuer’s acceptable price pi = pi(x1, C
a). From Definition 2.15 and
Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, we know that there exists a pair (ϕ′, τ i) ∈ Ψ(x1+pi, A)×T such that (pi, ϕ′)
satisfy (SH) and (pi, ϕ′, τ i) satisfy (BE), specifically, ϕ′ = Z and pi = Y0−x1, where (Y, Z,K) is the
unique solution to the reflected BSDE (19). Our next goal is to provide a detailed characterization
of all issuer’s break-even times associated with an issuer’s replicating strategy (pi, ϕ′). To establish
Theorem 3.2, which is the second main result in Section 3.3, we will need the following additional
assumption.
Assumption 3.5. The following extended comparison property for solutions to BSDEs holds: if for
j = 1, 2 {
dY js = −gj(s, Y
j
s , Z
j
s ) ds+ Z
j
s dSs − dH
j
s ,
Y jτ = ξj ,
where τ ∈ T , ξ1 ≥ ξ2, g1(s, Y 2s , Z
2
s ) ≥ g2(s, Y
2
s , Z
2
s ) for all s ∈ [0, τ ] and the process H
1 − H2 is
nondecreasing, then Y 1s ≥ Y
2
s for every s ∈ [0, τ ].
Remark 3.3. Suitable versions of the comparison theorem for BSDEs are known and thus Assump-
tion 3.5 can be checked to be met in several nonlinear market models (see, for instance, explicit
examples analyzed in Nie and Rutkowski [39]).
Before stating the main result in Section 3.3, let us recall the following well-known definition
related to nonlinear evaluations (see, e.g., Peng [42, 43]).
Definition 3.4. We say that a G-adapted, ca`dla`g process Y is an Eg,i-supermartingale (respectively,
an Eg,i-martingale) on [0, T ] if Ys ≥ E
g,i
s,t (Yt) (respectively, Ys = E
g,i
s,t (Yt)) for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumptions 3.1–3.5 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of Eg,i hold.
Then for the process ϕ′ = Z ∈ Ψ(x1 + pi, A) and an arbitrary τ ′ ∈ T the following assertions are
equivalent:
(i) τ ′ is an issuer’s break-even time for the pair (pi, ϕ′) ∈ R×Ψ(x1 + p
i, A),
(ii) the triplet (pi, ϕ′, τ ′) satisfies (NA),
(iii) the equality Vτ ′(x1 + p
i, ϕ′) = Xτ ′ holds,
(iv) Xτ ′ = Yτ ′ and Kτ ′ = 0 and thus Y is an Eg,i-martingale on [0, τ ′],
(v) τ ′ is a solution to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem, that is, Eg,i0,τ ′(Xτ ′) = v̂
i(Ca).
The stopping time τ i = inf {t ∈ [0, T ] |Yt = Xt} is the earliest issuer’s break-even time for (pi, ϕ′).
Proof. Recall that if ϕ′ = Z, then the pair (pi, ϕ′) is an issuer’s superhedging strategy for Ca (see
the proof of Proposition 3.1). It is thus is clear that assertions (i), (ii) and (iii) are equivalent.
(iii)⇒ (iv). From the proof of Proposition 3.1, we already know that Vt(x1 + pi, ϕ′) ≥ Yt ≥ Xt for
all t ∈ [0, T ] and thus, in particular, the inequality Vτ (x1 + pi, ϕ′) ≥ Yτ ≥ Xτ holds for every τ ∈ T .
Since we assumed that (iii) holds, we have Vτ ′(x1 + p
i, ϕ′) = Xτ ′ and thus Vτ ′(Y0, ϕ
′) = Yτ ′ = Xτ ′
(recall from Theorem 3.1(ii) that pi = Y0 − x1). It thus remains to show that Kτ ′ = 0. Since
the process V = V (Y0, ϕ
′) satisfies the SDE (23), it is an Eg,i-martingale and thus we obtain the
following equalities
Eg,i0,τ ′(Yτ ′) = E
g,i
0,τ ′
(
Vτ ′(Y0, ϕ
′)
)
= Y0. (27)
On the one hand, for any fixed t ∈ (0, T ] the process Y¯s := E
g,i
s,t (Yt), s ∈ [0, t] solves the following
BSDE {
dY¯s = −g(s, Y¯s, Z¯s) ds+ Z¯s dSs + dAs,
Y¯t = Yt.
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On the other hand, if (Y, Z,K) solves the reflected BSDE (19), then for any fixed [0, t], the pair
(Y˜ , Z˜) = (Y, Z) is a unique solution to the BSDE{
dY˜s = −g(s, Y˜s, Z˜s) ds+ Z˜s dSs + dAs − dKs,
Y˜t = Yt,
where K is a predetermined increasing process. Therefore, in view of the extended comparison
property of solutions to BSDEs (see Assumption 3.5), the inequality Eg,is,t (Yt) ≤ Yt holds for all
s ∈ [0, t] and thus Y is an Eg,i-supermartingale. Moreover, similarly to the above discussion, by
using the extended comparison property of solutions to BSDEs, one can show that, for any θ ∈ T ,
the inequality Eg,is,θ(Yθ) ≤ Ys holds for all s ∈ [0, θ]. We will now show that for every 0 ≤ s ≤ τ
′
Eg,is,τ ′(Yτ ′) = Ys. (28)
Let us assume, on the contrary, that equality (28) fails to hold. Then, using the strict comparison
property of Eg,i, we obtain Eg,i0,τ ′(Yτ ′) = E
g,i
0,s(E
g,i
s,τ ′(Yτ ′)) < E
g,i
0,s(Ys) ≤ Y0. This manifestly contradicts
(27) and thus (28) is valid. For every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ ′, from (28), we have Eg,it,τ ′(Yτ ′) = Yt and then
Eg,is,t (Yt) = E
g,i
s,t (E
g,i
t,τ ′(Yτ ′)) = E
g,i
s,τ ′(Yτ ′) = Ys,
where the last equality also comes from (28). We conclude that Y is an Eg,i-martingale on [0, τ ′]
and thus the equality Kτ ′ = 0 follows.
(iv)⇒ (iii). By assumption, Yτ ′ = Xτ ′ and Kτ ′ = 0 and thus the reflected BSDE (19) reduces to
the following BSDE on [0, τ ′]{
dYt = −g(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt,
Yτ ′ = Xτ ′ .
The above BSDE can also be represented in the forward manner, for t ∈ [0, τ ′],
dYt = −g(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt,
where the initial value Y0 and the process Z are given. Similarly, the wealth process V := V (x1 +
pi, ϕ′) = V (Y0, Z) solves the following SDE, for t ∈ [0, T ],
dVt = −g(t, Vt, Zt) dt+ Zt dSt + dAt,
with initial condition V0 = Y0. From the uniqueness of a solution to the above SDE, we infer that
Vt = Yt for t ∈ [0, τ ′]. In particular, Vτ ′(x1 + pi, ϕ′) = Yτ ′ = Xτ ′ , as was required to show.
(iv)⇒ (v). From the Eg,i-martingale property of Y on [0, τ ′], we get Eg,i0,τ ′(Yτ ′) = Y0. In view of
Assumption 3.3, we have that Y0 = v
i(Ca) and thus the equalities Eg,i0,τ ′(Xτ ′) = v
i(Ca) = v̂i(Ca) hold,
which means that τ ′ is a solution to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem.
(v)⇒ (iv). From condition (v) and Assumption 3.3, we obtain the equality Y0 = E
g,i
0,τ ′(Xτ ′). We
will now use similar arguments as in the proof of the implication (iii)⇒ (iv). First, the process
X¯s := E
g,i
s,t (Xτ ′) solves the following BSDE{
dX¯s = −g(s, X¯s, Z¯s) ds+ Z¯s dSs + dAs,
X¯τ ′ = Xτ ′ ,
and it also satisfies X¯0 = Y0. Second, if (Y, Z,K) solves the reflected BSDE (19), then the pair
(Y˜ , Z˜) = (Y, Z) is a unique solution to the BSDE{
dY˜s = −g(s, Y˜s, Z˜s) ds+ Z˜s dSs + dAs − dKs,
Y˜τ ′ = Yτ ′ ≥ Xτ ′,
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where K is a predetermined increasing process and, obviously, Y˜0 = Y0. The extended comparison
property of solutions to BSDEs yields the inequality Eg,it,τ ′(Yτ ′) ≤ Yt for all t ∈ [0, τ
′]. Therefore, if
Yτ ′ ≥ Xτ ′ and Yτ ′ 6= Xτ ′, then the strict comparison property of Eg,i gives
Y0 ≥ E
g,i
0,τ ′(Yτ ′) > E
g,i
0,τ ′(Xτ ′) = Y0,
which is a contradiction. This shows that Yτ ′ = Xτ ′ . As in the proof of the implication (iii)⇒ (iv),
we argue that Y is an Eg,i-martingale on [0, τ ′] and thus the equality Kτ ′ = 0 is satisfied.
It remains to show that the last assertion is valid. In view of Assumption 3.4, τ i is a solution
to the issuer’s optimal stopping problem and thus, from part (v), τ i is an issuer’s break-even time
for (pi, ϕ′). In view of (iv), for any break-even time for for (pi, ϕ′) we have that Xτ ′ = Yτ ′ . The
definition of τ i now shows that it is the earliest issuer’s break-even time for Ca. ✷
3.5 Holder’s Acceptable Price via RBSDE
We now address the pricing, hedging and exercising problems from the perspective of the holder.
The corresponding nonlinear evaluation Eg,−A, which is defined through solutions to the holder’s
BSDE
yt = ζs +
∫ s
t
g(u, yu, zu) du−
∫ s
t
zu dSu +As −At, (29)
is henceforth denoted by Eg,h and called the holder’s g-evaluation. For brevity, we denote by x :=
V b(x2) +X
h the holder’s relative reward and we assume that the process x is square-integrable.
Assumption 3.6. The reflected BSDE with the upper obstacle x{
dyt = −g(t, yt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt + dkt,
yT = xT , yt ≤ xt,
∫ T
0 (xt − yt) dk
c
t = 0, ∆k
d
t = ∆(yt +At)1{yt−=xt−},
(30)
has a unique solution (y, z, k) where k is a G-predictable, nondecreasing process such that k0 = 0
and k = kc + kd is its unique decomposition into continuous and jump components.
Definition 3.5. We say that vh(Ca) ∈ R is the value of the holder’s optimal stopping problem for
Ca if
vh(Ca) = inf
τ∈T
Eg,h0,τ (xτ ).
A stopping time τ∗ ∈ T is called a solution to the holder’s optimal stopping problem if vh(Ca) =
v˘h(Ca) where
v˘h(Ca) := Eg,h0,τ∗(xτ∗) = min
τ∈T
Eg,h0,τ (xτ ). (31)
The following assumptions can be justified by an independent analysis of a nonlinear optimal
stopping problem. Although we take here the properties stated in Assumptions 3.7 and 3.8 for
granted, it is worth to mention that they are supported by recent results in Grigorova et al. [20, 21].
Assumption 3.7. The value vh(Ca) to the holder’s optimal stopping problem exists and satisfies
vh(Ca) = y0.
Assumption 3.8. The stopping time τh := inf {t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = xt} is a solution to the holder’s
optimal stopping problem.
A salient feature of an American contract is a holder’s rational exercise time, which in our
framework is defined as follows.
Definition 3.6. We say that τ ∈ T is a rational exercise time for the holder of Ca if the contract
is traded at the holder’s maximum superhedging cost p̂s,h = p̂s,h(x2, C
a) at time 0 and there exists
a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(x2 − p̂s,h,−A) such that Vτ (x2 − p̂s,h, ψ) ≥ xτ .
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In fact, we will use Definition 3.6 within the setup where the equality p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = p̂s,h(x2, Ca)
holds. If, in addition, the strict comparison property for the BSDE with the driver g is satisfied,
then the inequality Vτ (x2 − p̂r,h, ψ) ≥ xτ can be replaced by the equality Vτ (x2 − p̂r,h, ψ) = xτ so
that a rational exercise time is also a holder’s break-even time. The following theorem describes the
properties of a solution to the holder’s pricing problem for an American contract Ca.
Theorem 3.3. Let Assumption 3.1 and 3.6–3.8 be satisfied and let (y, z, k) be a unique solution to
the holder’s reflected BSDE (30). Then the following assertions are valid.
(i) If Eg,h has the strict comparison property, then
p̂r,h(x2, C
a) = p̂s,h(x2, C
a) = x2 − y0 = x2 − E
g,h
0,τh
(xτh) = x2 − v˘
h(Ca). (32)
A holder’s replicating strategy for Ca is given by the triplet (p′, ψ′, τ ′) = (x2 − y0, z, τ
h) and τh is a
holder’s rational exercise time.
(ii) If Eg,h has the strict comparison property, then the holder’s acceptable price for Ca equals
ph(x2, Ca) = x2 − y0 = x2 − v˘h(Ca).
Proof. As in the case of the issuer, we split the proof into three steps, which are formulated as
Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. They can be seen as the holder’s counterparts of Propositions 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3, although their statements and proofs differ from the issuer’s case. ✷
Note the Assumption 3.8 is not postulated in the next result. It is worth stressing that the
equality ps,h(x2, Ca) = x2 − y0 does not necessarily hold under the assumptions of Proposition 3.4
and the holder’s maximum superhedging cost p̂s,h(x2, Ca) is not necessarily well defined.
Proposition 3.4. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6–3.7 are satisfied and Eg,h has the comparison property,
then
ps,h(x2, C
a) ≤ x2 − v
h(Ca) = x2 − y0, (33)
where (y, z, k) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (30).
Proof. We will show that ps,h ≤ x2 − y0. By the definition of the supremum, it is enough to
show that x2 − y0 ≥ p for all p ∈ Hs,h(x2). From the definition of Hs,h(x2), we know that for any
p ∈ Hs,h(x2), there exists a pair (ψ, τ) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A) × T such that Vτ (x2 − p, ψ) ≥ xτ . The
comparison property of Eg,h gives
x2 − p = E
g,h
0,τ
(
Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)
)
≥ Eg,h0,τ (xτ )
and thus
x2 − p ≥ inf
τ∈T
Eg,h0,τ
(
Vτ (x2 − p, ψ)
)
≥ inf
τ∈T
Eg,h0,τ (xτ ) = v
h(Ca) = y0,
where the last equality follows from Assumption 3.7. We have thus shown that ps,h(x2, Ca) ≤
x2 − y0 = x2 − vh(Ca). ✷
We will now give conditions under which, in particular, the holder’s maximum superhedging and
replication costs are well defined and we show that they are equal, that is, p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = p̂s,h(x2, Ca).
Proposition 3.5. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6–3.8 are satisfied and Eg,h has the strict comparison
property, then:
(i) (x2 − y0, z, τh) is a holder’s replicating strategy for Ca,
(ii) the holder’s maximum replication cost is well defined and satisfies
p̂r,h(x2, C
a) = p̂s,h(x2, C
a) = x2 − y0 = x2 − v˘
h(Ca) = x2 − E
g,h
0,τh
(xτh).
Proof. We already know that x2 − y0 ≥ p
s,h ≥ pr,h (see (12) and (33)). Hence to prove parts (i)
and (ii), it suffices to show that if (y, z, k) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (30), then
(p′, ψ′, τ ′) = (x2− y0, z, τh) is a holder’s replicating strategy. The wealth process V = V (x2− p′, ψ′)
satisfies the SDE
dVt = −g(t, Vt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt, (34)
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where the initial value V0 = y0 and the process z are given. The definition of τ
h and the right-
continuity of the processes x and y ensure that xτh = yτh so that
y0 = v˘
h(Ca) = Eg,h
0,τh
(xτh) = E
g,h
0,τh
(yτh),
where the second equality is a consequence of Assumption 3.8, and thus we see that y0 = E
g,h
0,τh
(yτh).
Therefore, using the strict comparison property of Eg,h and simple arguments analogous to those
used in the derivation of the equality Kτ i = 0 in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we obtain the equality
kτh = 0. Since kt = 0 on [0, τ
h], the reflected BSDE (30) can be seen on [0, τh] as the forward SDE
dyt = −g(t, yt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt, (35)
where the initial value y0 = V0 and the process z are given. From the uniqueness of a solution
to the SDE (34), it follows that V = y on [0, τh]. Hence Vτh = yτh = xτh and thus the triplet
(p′, ψ′, τ ′) = (x2 − y0, z, τh) is indeed a holder’s replicating strategy. ✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.4, we need to examine the existence of the holder’s acceptable
price ph(x2, Ca). This will be done in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6–3.8 are satisfied and Eg,h has the strict comparison
property, then the holder’s acceptable price ph(x2, Ca) is well defined and
ph(x2, C
a) = p˘f,h(x2, C
a) = p̂r,h(x2, C
a) = p̂s,h(x2, C
a).
Proof. We will first show that p̂r,h ∈ Hf,h(x2). In view of (6) and (7), it is enough to prove that
p̂r,h(x2, Ca) > p for every p ∈ Ha,h(x2). To this end, we argue by contradiction. Let us write
p̂ = p̂r,h(x2, Ca). Assume that p̂ ∈ Ha,h(x2) so that there exists (ϕ̂, τ̂) ∈ Ψ(x2 − p̂) × T such that
(p̂, ϕ̂, τ̂ ) satisfies (AO′), that is,
P
(
Vτ̂ (x2 − p̂, ϕ̂) ≥ xτ̂
)
= 1 and P
(
Vτ̂ (x2 − p̂, ϕ̂) > xτ̂
)
> 0.
By applying the mapping Eg,h, we obtain
x2 − p̂ = E
g,h
0,τ̂
(
Vτ̂ (x2 − p̂
r,h, ϕ̂)
)
> Eg,h0,τ̂ (xτ̂ ) ≥ inf
τ∈T
Eg,h0,τ (xτ ) = E
g,h
0,τh
(xτh) = x2 − p̂,
where the last equality comes from Proposition 3.5. This is a contradiction and thus p̂r,h(x2, Ca) /∈
Ha,h(x2). In general, either Ha,h(x2) = (−∞, p
a,h(x2, Ca)] or Ha,h(x2) = (−∞, p
a,h(x2, Ca)) and we
argue that the latter situation occurs. Indeed, from Assumption 3.1, Lemma 2.5 and Propositions
3.4 and 3.5, we have p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = p̂s,h(x2, Ca) = p
a,h(x2, Ca) and thus, since p̂r,h(x2, Ca) is not in
Ha,h(x2), we conclude that Ha,h(x2) = (−∞, p
a,h(x2, Ca)). It is also clear that p̂r,h(x2, Ca) > p for
every p ∈ Ha,h(x2) and thus p̂r,h(x2, Ca) belongs to Hf,h(x2) so that Hf,r,h(x2) 6= ∅. We complete
the proof by making use of Proposition 2.2. ✷
3.6 Holder’s Rational Exercise Times
We conclude the paper by an analysis of the properties of holder’s rational exercise times. Note that
in Theorem 3.4 we work under the assertions of Theorem 3.3. It is thus known that the equality
p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = p̂s,h(x2, Ca) holds and thus a stopping time τ ∈ T is a holder’s rational exercise time
if the contract is traded at the holder’s maximum replication cost p̂r,h = p̂r,h(x2, Ca) at time 0 and
there exists a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(x2 − p̂
r,h,−A) such that Vτ (x2 − p̂
r,h, ψ) = xτ . We thus deal here
with a natural extension of the classical concept of a rational exercise time for the holder of an
American option when the underlying market model is linear. Let us notice that in any complete
linear market, albeit not in a general nonlinear market, any holder’s rational exercise time is also a
break-even time for the issuer (in particular, the equality τh = τ i is satisfied).
Recall thatG-adapted, ca`dla`g process Y is an Eg,h-submartingale (respectively, an Eg,h-martingale)
on [0, T ] if Ys ≤ E
g,h
s,t (Yt) (respectively, Ys = E
g,h
s,t (Yt)) for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
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The following result gives a characterisation of all holder’s rational exercise times and describes
the earliest and the latest rational exercise times. Of course, results of this kind are well known
from the existing literature on a classical optimal stopping problem (see, for instance, Kobylanski
and Quenez [36]). For nonlinear optimal stopping problems, the interested reader is also referred to
Dumitrescu [11] and Grigorova et al. [20, 21].
Theorem 3.4. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5–3.8 be satisfied and the strict comparison property of
Eg,h hold. In particular, let (y, z, k) be the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (30). Then a
stopping time τ ′ ∈ T is a holder’s rational exercise time if and only if the following conditions are
met:
(i) y is a Eg,h-martingale on [0, τ ′], that is, kτ ′ = 0,
(ii) the equality yτ ′ = xτ ′ holds.
The earliest holder’s rational exercise time equals τh := inf {t ∈ [0, T ] | yt = xt}. If, in addition,
the process k is continuous, then τ¯h := inf {t ∈ [0, T ] | kt > 0} is the latest holder’s rational exercise
time.
Proof. Let τ ′ ∈ T be any stopping time such that conditions (i) and (ii) are met. Since yτ ′ = xτ ′
and kτ ′ = 0, we see that the triplet (y, z, k) solves the following BSDE on [0, τ
′]{
dyt = −g(t, yt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt,
yτ ′ = xτ ′ ,
which can also be written in the forward manner, for all t ∈ [0, τ ′],
dyt = −g(t, yt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt,
where initial condition y0 and the process z are given. Now we take ψ = z and we recall that
p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = x2 − y0 (see Proposition 3.6). Hence the wealth process V = V (x2 − p̂r,h(x2, Ca), ψ)
satisfies the following SDE for all t ∈ [0, T ]
dVt = −g(t, Vt, zt) dt+ zt dSt − dAt,
with initial condition V0 = y0. From the uniqueness of a solution to the above SDE, we infer that
Vt = yt ≤ xt for every t ∈ [0, τ ′]. In particular, Vτ ′ = yτ ′ = xτ ′ and thus τ ′ is a rational exercise
time for the holder of Ca.
Let us now assume that τ ′ is a rational exercise time for the holder of Ca. From Definition 3.6,
it follows that for p = p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = x2 − y0 there exists a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(x2 − p,−A) such that
Vτ ′(x2 − p, ψ) ≥ xτ ′ . The comparison property of Eg,h yields
y0 = x2 − p = E
g,h
0,τ ′
(
Vτ ′(x2 − p, ψ)
)
≥ Eg,h0,τ ′(xτ ′) ≥ E
g,h
0,τ ′(yτ ′), (36)
where the last inequality is valid since xτ ′ ≥ yτ ′ . For any fixed t ∈ (0, T ], the process y¯s := E
g,h
s,t (yt)
solves the following BSDE on [0, t]{
dy¯s = −g(s, y¯s, z¯s) ds+ z¯s dSs − dAs,
y¯t = yt,
and, if (y, z, k) solves the reflected BSDE (30), then y satisfies the following BSDE on [0, t]{
dys = −g(s, ys, zs) ds+ zs dSs − dAs + dks,
yt = yt.
Using the extended comparison property postulated in Assumption 3.5, we get ys ≤ y¯s = E
g,h
s,t (yt)
for all s ∈ [0, t] and thus y is an Eg,h-submartingale. Furthermore, using the extended comparison
property of solutions to BSDEs, one can show that for any θ ∈ T we have Eg,hs,θ (yθ) ≥ ys for all
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s ∈ [0, θ]. In view of (36) and the strict comparison property of Eg,h, we deduce that for every
0 ≤ s ≤ τ ′
Eg,hs,τ ′(yτ ′) = ys. (37)
Indeed, suppose that this is not true. Then the strict comparison property of Eg,h would yield
Eg,h0,τ ′(yτ ′) = E
g,h
0,s (E
g,h
s,τ ′(yτ ′)) > E
g,h
0,s (ys) ≥ y0,
which would contradict (36).
We now claim that for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ ′, we have that Eg,hs,t (yt) = ys. To show this, we observe that
(37) yields Eg,ht,τ ′(yτ ′) = yt and thus
Eg,hs,t (yt) = E
g,h
s,t (E
g,h
t,τ ′(yτ ′)) = E
g,h
s,τ ′(yτ ′) = ys,
where the last equality also comes from (37). We thus see that y is an Eg,h-martingale on [0, τ ′] and
thus kτ ′ = 0. In particular, we have E
g,h
0,τ ′(yτ ′) = y0 and thus, using (36), we obtain
y0 = E
g,h
0,τ ′(xτ ′) = E
g,h
0,τ ′(yτ ′) = E
g,h
0,τ ′
(
Vτ ′(x2 − p, ψ)
)
. (38)
By combining this equality with the inequality yτ ′ ≤ xτ ′ and the strict comparison property of Eg,h,
we conclude that yτ ′ = xτ ′ . We have thus shown that if τ
′ is a rational exercise time, then conditions
(i)–(ii) are valid.
Let us show that τh is a rational exercise time. From the definition of τh and the right-continuity
of y and x, we infer that yτh = xτh . Equality kτh = 0 has been already established in Proposition
3.5. Hence τh satisfies conditions (i)–(ii) and thus it is one of the holder’s rational exercise times
and it is the earliest one, since yt < xt for all t ∈ [0, τh).
It remains to prove that τ¯h is the latest rational exercise time under an additional assumption
that the process k is continuous so that k = kc. We need to show that yτ¯h = xτ¯h . For an arbitrary
ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ [0, ε] such that kτ¯h+δ > 0. Since
∫ T
0 (xt−yt) dkt = 0, from the right-continuity
of processes y and x and the inequality x ≥ y, we obtain the equality yτ¯h = xτ¯h . Since, obviously,
kt = 0 for t ∈ [0, τ¯h), we also have kτ¯h = 0. This shows that τ¯
h is one of the holder’s rational
exercise times. Moreover, it is the latest one since, if τ ′ ∈ T is such that P(τ ′ > τ¯h) > 0, then
P(kτ ′ > 0) > 0 and thus the equality kτ ′ = 0 cannot hold. Note, however, that if the continuity of k
is not postulated, then it may happen that kτ¯h 6= 0 in which case τ¯
h fails to be a rational exercise
time (for instance, such properties are always true if k = kd). ✷
Remark 3.4. From the proof of Theorem 3.4 (see, in particular, equation (38)), the inequality
Vτ ′(x2 − p, ψ) ≥ xτ ′ and the strict comparison property of Eg,h, we deduce that when the equality
p̂r,h(x2, C
a) = p̂s,h(x2, C
a) holds, then for any rational exercise time given by Definition 3.6 we have
that Vτ (x2 − p̂r,h, ψ) = xτ , meaning that a rational exercise time is also a holder’s break-even time.
It is also obvious that a holder’s break-even time is a rational exercise time. Thus when the equality
p̂r,h(x2, Ca) = p̂s,h(x2, Ca) holds, then the inequality Vτ (x2 − p̂r,h, ψ) ≥ xτ in Definition 3.6 can be
replaced by the equality Vτ (x2− p̂r,h, ψ) = xτ . Once again, it is worth noting that this observation is
fully consistent with the standard definition of a rational exercise time for the holder of an American
option in a classical complete, linear market model, such as the Black and Scholes model.
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